This study analyzes the effectof changes in corporate controlon the way shareholdersbenefit from the announcements of selling and buying airlines, thus contributing to the literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in emerging markets. Using a methodologyof event study, including GARCH and OLS models, we find evidence that some selling companies obtain abnormal returns that are statisticallysignificant after the announcement of the M&A. However, when the merger is not strategic, the companies present statisticallysignificant negative abnormal returns. The resultsare not conclusive when analyzing the effecton the valueof the buying companies.
INTRODUCTION
With the use of mergers and acquisitions (M&As),airlinesfrom many economies at the global level have sought to upgrade their capacity for commercialization, stay on the market, expand to new markets,andreduce costs tosurvive in an increasingly competitive market (Zhang and Aldridge 1997; Clougherty 2002; Merkert and Morrell 2012; Ryerson and Kim 2014) . Similarly, the volume of M&A announcements in the airline market 1 in
Latin American economies has experienced significant growth in recent years. According to information from the Datastream database, in the 1990s,only21 announcements were reported, while between 2000 and 2013,there were72 announcements, with a growth of 242.9%. Thus, as a strategy to face the challenges of a globalized market, M&As have played a fundamental role in countries'economic growth.
Given thatM&As are complex phenomena, both in their reasons and results, they have been studied from various perspectives. Some works have mainly focused on examining the economic and financial implications (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rossy and Volpin 2004; Di Giovanni 2005; Ovtchinnikov 2013 ) and incentives for administrative managementandcorporategovernance in M&A operations (Roll 1986; Jensen 1986; Kosnik and Shapiro 1997; Starks and Wei 2013) . There have also been event studies on marketreactionsfollowing M&A announcements (Eckbo 1983; Eckbo and Langohr 1989; Bhagat et al. 2005) . Alternatively, various authors have taken interest in the longterm behavior of company performance after an M&A operation (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Cosh and Guest 2001; Bradley and Sundaram 2004; Daniliuc et al. 2014) .
Generally, the majority of studies concerningM&As have been conducted in the marketsof the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe,and Asia 2 . Pioneering studies in Latin
Americaon the subject of M&As have been conducted by Fuenzalida et al. (2006) , who identified the existence of abnormal returnsin the valueof purchased companiesas a result of the announcementof a public offerof acquisitionin these countries;by Pablo (2009) ,who studied the determinants of transnational M&As in Latin American countries;andby Vasco et al. (2014) ,who studied the influence of corporate governanceon translational M&A activity in Latin American countries.
The objective of this studyis to analyze the impactof changes in corporate controlon the valueof airline companiesin Latin America, i.e.,establishing the expectations on the way shareholdersbenefit from announcementsin acquired and acquiring companies, thus contributing to the M&A literature in emerging markets, where there is scarcedataon the subject. Given the lack of a specific theoretical framework for M&As in the airline industry, the study is focused on the general literature on M&As. Our empirical studies have examined the effects of M&As on company performance, share price,andvalue creation. In this context, some studiesconclude that shareholdersof the acquiring companyearn little or nothing, with the possibility that they may even lose (Loderer and Martin 1990; Walker 2000; Moeller et al. 2005; Hackbarth andMorellec 2008; Hamza 2009 , Hitt et al. 2009 ). By contrast, other empirical studiesshow that on average,shareholdersof the acquired companybenefit from M&A announcementsor as a result of the operation, with the stock market valueof the companiesthat merge increasing (Schwert 1996; Andrade et al. 2001; Goergen and Renneboog 2004; Campa and Hernando 2006; Kiymaz and Baker 2008) . Taking into account that the resultsare to a large extent ambiguous, researchers have focused on explaining them from two main perspectives. The first perspective is related to rational motivations to conduct the transaction,andthe second is relatedto irrational or behavioral motivations.
Regarding rational motivations, the determinantsof M&As may be analyzed based on the neoclassical hypothesis, which suggests that the purpose of mergers between companiesis to increase their efficiencyin the face ofchanges, such as regulations, costs,andtechnological innovationsthat affect the structure of the industry or cause industrial shocks (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Church and Ware 2000; Jovanovicand Rousseau 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rossy and Volpin 2004) . On this subject, Nelson (1959) finds that economic movements (e.g., the growth of an economy) andthe business cycle are related to M&A activity. For their part, authors such as Gort (1969) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that shocks andstructural changes in industries (e.g.,deregulation) require the redistribution of assets to more productive use, which justifies M&As as a way of achieving this.
According to Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) ,a positive demand shock in an industry increases the opportunity cost for the inefficientproducer, andconsequently, assetsare relocated in search of greater productivity. In his study, Harford (2005) provides evidence for the start of M&A waves in an entire economyas a response to structural shocks that affect various industriessimultaneously.
Meanwhile, irrational or behavioral motivationsrelate the appearance of M&As to distortions in the market valueof companies (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Rossy and Volpin 2004; Gugler et al. 2012) or to the personal motivations of directors that are not in line with the interests of shareholders (Jensen 1986; Roll 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Kosnik and Shapiro 1997) .
When considering the two alternatives notedaboveandtaking into account that the fundamental purpose of an M&A is to generate synergies, empirical studieshave found that rational motivations, corresponding to the neoclassical hypothesis, are those that may, to the greatest degree,provide benefits to shareholder wealth (Wang 2007; Carpenter and Sanders 2008) . Meanwhile, irrational or behavioral motivations may be a response to valuedestruction for shareholders (Sirower 1997; Wang 2007) . In this context, the valuecreated for shareholders, derived from the merger, may be explained by the synergies in efficiency, including more efficient management, economies of scale andscope, vertical integration (Church and Ware 2000; Weston et al. 2004) 3 , horizontal integration, better production techniques, combining complimentary resources, changing assetsto more productiveapplications, or market power achieved (Eckbo 1983; García and Trillas 2011) .
There is much consensus as investors expect a company that is being bought to be able to include in the final merger price the final benefits of the alliance. Eckbo (1983) argues that M&As generate positive abnormal returnsin the selling company.Because it increases the probability of efficient collusion between rival producers, the merger generates increased commercial valuefor the companiesthrough productive efficiency and the implementation of a more efficient production cost policy, apart from lower transaction costs. This is reflected in the positive abnormal returnsof the purchased companyon the date of the event, 3Since this may eliminate the double marginalization that emerges when two companies that are in the same production chain have great market power or complimentary goods are under common control.
while the buyer has negative abnormal returnsor returns close to zero on the day of the event. Similarly, the resultsfound by Andrade et al. (2001) show that shareholders of the selling companyclearly benefit from the merger, withvaluecreation for this companyaccumulatingby16 % on average. Meanwhile the impactof the merger on the purchasing company, on average on the share value, generates a reduction of 0.7 %, but the result is not statistically significant.
Moreover, Campa and Hernando (2004) 
II. DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY

A. Data
The information concerningM&A announcementsin the airline industryfor Latin American countriesin the 1996-2013 period was obtained from the Datastream database. This databasecontains information on M&A activity for countriesfrom the entire world since 1985. However, the dataprior to 1996 were not includedbecause there were no announcementsin these years for publicly listed companies. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codesused were 4512 (air transportation, scheduled), 4513 (air courier services),and 4522 (air transportation, nonscheduled). We excludedleveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases,andprivatizations 4 from the sample. Our initial databasecontained 77 announcements. However,toactually capture the effectof surprise announcements, the dates were verified in Bloomberg, The Economist Intelligence Unit, and online news sources for each countrycomprising the definitive sample.
Additionally, we excluded from the samplethe announcementsof airlineswhose shares were not traded on the day before andafter the announcement because each eventconsists of the day before the news, the day of the news,andthe day after the news[T-1,T+1] (Eckbo 1983; Mulherin and Boone 2000; Andrade et al. 2001 ). Finally,after applying the defined criteria,the obtained sample is presented in Table 1 , which distinguishes between eventsof buying andselling companies.
[ Table 1 here]
The daily share prices for each companyandthe MSCImarket index (Emerging Markets Index)have been taken from Bloomberg. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the selected companies'performance andthe MSCIfor the analysis period.
[ Table 2 here]
B. M&A activity in the Latin America Airline industry
As specified in Table3, from 1996 [ Table 3 here]
Examining other characteristics of the announcements, as shown in Table 4 ,we find that in the study period, 61.04% of announcementswere made by national buyers and20.78% by buyers from Latin American countries. A total of 7.79% of the M&A announcementshave come from European countries 5 , 6.49% from the United States,andthe rest from other world regions. When observing the annual behavior, this proportion remains relatively stable,especially over the last decade.
[ Table 4 here] 5 Mainly from Russia, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and Poland. The arrangement for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investment between countries may be a factor that promotes foreign investment in various industries. For example, Brazilhas been the object of foreign investmentin airlinesfrom Portugal, with which it has this type of agreement, and the same is true for Bolivia and Great Britainas well as Argentina and France. For information on agreements, see http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/main_s.asp.
in the same industry (targeting) 6 , while the rest correspond to other objectives, such as diversification or vertical integration. Finally, when reviewing the payment method, we find that for the entire set of M&A announcementswith disclosed negotiation details, the main payment method is cash. Table 5offers more details about the disclosed information.
[Table5here]
C. Methodology
One of the most frequently used methodologiesforassessingboth corporate eventsandthe effectsof regulation changes in various industrieshas been "event studies". These studies are used to examine the returns of a companyduring the "event window"to determine whether this performance is abnormally positive or negative. The event window is defined as the The theoretical basis of this methodologyis the semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis. This hypothesisholds that the mean price of a companyreflects at any time its best estimate based on available information on the marketof future liquidity flows discounted for this company (Cox and Portes 1998; Markiel 2003) , assuming that all publicly available information is incorporated into the average price 8 , as agents transmit messages with this new information in the market, which becomes publicly available and incorporated into the average price,andtherefore,the price provides the best estimate for the change in a company's market value as a result of unexpected announcements. 6 We define targeting as the M&As between companies where the first two digits of the SIC code coincide, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) . 7 To broaden this methodology,see Campbell et al. (1997) , Mackinlay (1997) , Binder (1998), Kothari and Warner (2006), and Aktas et al.(2007) . 8 Ederington and Lee (1995) find that news announcements on macroeconomic variables are completely absorbed by the markets in fifteen minutes and that the majority of the reaction in mean prices happens within forty seconds from the news announcement. Nevertheless, news on mergers and acquisitions must be analyzed in depth by investors and takes more time to be absorbed by the market, but in any case this occurs on the day of the news.
the expected value of the returns of companyjin periodt, not conditioned by event
, is the market modelwhere the jt X do not include the event. This modelis represented by equation (1) (Fama et al. 1969; Campbell et al. 1997) . The same modelhas been used to measure the performance of abnormal returns, including a dummy to capture the effectof the news, as shown in equation (2). This is the methodologyused in our study.
where the coefficient j  captures the abnormal returnof action jin the date of event t, directly estimated in the regression.
Toimprove the power of the estimatesas suggested by Campbell et al. (1997) 9 , the events of abnormal returnsin the event windowcan also be aggregated. If we consider 1 T to be the first observation in the event windowand 2 T to be the second, then the aggregationofabnormal returnswould be the accumulations ) , (
Under the nullhypothesis, accumulatedabnormal returnshave a normal distribution with a mean of zero anda variance of sigma (Campbell et al. 1997 ). When there is more than one 1. In this study, we group the eventsby companyfor the study period.
[ Figure 1 here]
The approach displayed inFigure 1 improves the obtained estimates by adding events of the same nature throughout time, thus increasing the size of the event window. This methodologyhas been used by Trillas (2001) in a case studyof the free cash flow theory,by Bel and Trillas (2005) in a studyof collusion in the privatization of the telecommunicationssector andby Dnes and Seaton (1999) to study the effectsof regulating regional electricity companies in the United Kingdom. The main disadvantage when subevents from the window typicallyconsist of three observations (as daily data are used)is that the significancetest of abnormal returnsis inadequate for such a small sampleand thus has little power (Campbell et al. 1997 ).
However, as stated by Savickas (2003) 10 , an appropriate approach to estimate volatility for the conditional process of the variance, which controls for the impactof unrelated events in the estimate of window AR , may be represented by equation (4) in the following way: The fundamental reason why is that when taking the GARCHapproach, the volatility of the returns process,andwith this the increases in the variance when there are induced events, may be explicitly modeled (Savickas 2003) . Table 6 shows the accumulated returns CAR for selling companies. Here we see the following results.The airlines Consorcio Aeroméxico SAB de CV fromMexicoand Gol
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Effectson the valueof selling companies
Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA and TAM Linhas Aéreas SA fromBrazilhave positive abnormal returnsthat are statistically significant at 1%, estimated with the GARCH methodology. These resultsrange from 2.1% to 8.5%, which are similar when estimating with OLS. However, as may be expected, estimating with GARCHimproves their significancebecause, for example, Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA usingOLS has a significance levelof 5%,while with GARCH,it is 1%.These resultsare in line with prior studies (Eckbo 1983; Bradley et al. 1988; Schwert 1996; Andrade et al. 2001; Goergen and Renneboog 2004; Campa and Hernando 2006; Kiymaz and Baker 2008; García et al. 2012 )andsupport hypothesis 1 from this study.
[ Table 6 here]
Other important resultsof this research are as follows: it is not enough for the companiesto be the selling party to achieve positive abnormal returns,it is alsonecessary for the integration to be strategic andfor the integration to create synergiesin valuecreation (Sirower 1997) . This is the case of the airline Varig SAfrom Brazil, which experienced a statistically significant negative abnormal returnof -2.7% (see Table 6 ). According to Bloombergnews, its sale was due to a restructuring process brought on by bankruptcy. In this case, it is important to note that for the study period, this company was in a restructuring process, whichmayjustify the results. Some important events for this airline include the following: on 8 June 2006,an offer from the investment fund Multilog was announced for the purchase of Varig SA airlines, which had previously announced its bankruptcy, having previously been the largest airlineinBrazil. This offer amounted to US$800 million and was financed with bank loans and bond issues. On the same date, it was announced that the judge presiding over therestructuring was analyzing a proposal from a group of employees, pilots,andflight attendants, offering US$449 million for this airline, out of which US$125 million was debt owed to employees. Initially, the employees Table 7 reports the resultsobtained from the GARCH and OLS estimates for acquiring companies; they do not differ from prior empirical evidence (Loderer and Martin 1990; Walker 2000; Moeller et al. 2005; Hackbarth andMorellec 2008; Hamza 2009; Hitt et al. 2009 ). Thus, we confirmhypothesis 2 of this study.The airline Avianca SA from Colombia and the airlines TAM Linhas Aéreas SA and Varig SA, both from Brazil, did not see statistically significant abnormal changes in the return to shareholdersafter the announcementof M&As. For their part, Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes SA from 11 We should clarify that for the estimates of LAN Airlines SA and Grupo Aeroméxico SAB de CV we only have one event each.
B. Effectson the valueof buying companies
abnormal returnsof 1.4% and 2.0%,respectively.
[ Table 7 here]
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the present study, we examine the M&A activity of the Latin American airline industry, which has not been the focus of much research, in the period 1996-2013. Using GARCH and OLS models, we show that some selling companiesobtain statistically significant abnormal returnsafter the announcementof M&As. However, when the merger is not strategic, companiespresent statistically significant negative abnormal returns. For their part, the resultsare not conclusivewhen analyzing the effecton the valueof buying companies.
We expect the resultsof this studyto increase the understanding of the dynamics of corporate finance in the region;we also expect the results to be supporting material both for scholars interested in the subject of M&As and for decision makers in companies.It is important to be clear about the context in which negotiations andcompany performance take place within the functioning of theindustryat the national and international level andthe effectthat these negotiations and this performance have for valuecreation in companies.
Given the datalimitations for the analyzed region, we recommend future studiesfor analyzing the effecton company value, according to the integrationstrategy employed (horizontal, vertical,or diversification) .We also recommend analyzing some companiesthat had only recently started to be publicly traded or had a small number of eventswhen conducting our researchand investigatingthe effectof the changes of corporate controlon their returns.Similarly, the long-term behavior of airline performance after M&As should also be researched.
Another important subject that should be examined is related to the impactof M&Ason the performance of the closest competitors to the selling companybecause, as established by Eckbo (1983) Thistableshows the descriptivestatistics of daily performancein the 1996-2013 periodfor the companiesfrom Latin Americaselected for the study. We also observe the statistics for the Emerging Market Index (MSCI).
Thistablereports the number of M&A announcementsby year in Latin American countries, as reported by Datastream, by the type of deal. In the first classification, "Targeting" refers todeals within the same industrygiven by the first two digits of the SIC code of the buying and selling company, "Diversification" refers to other deals. The second classification is based on payment method: cash, shares, shares and cash, or not specified. The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases, and privatizations. Thistablereports the abnormal returnsusing GARCH and OLS estimates for the selling companiesin the group of Latin American countriesin the 1996-2013 period. The following deals are excluded from the sample: a) leveraged buyouts (LBOs), spin-offs, recapitalizations, repurchases,andprivatizations. The p-values are in brackets. *, **,and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%,and 1%,respectively. 
